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New ways of measuring corruption are being used to assess the 
performance of governments in tackling the problem. The Pacific 
Islands Plan, for example, envisages a ‘control of corruption 
(integrity) indicator’ that could be used to assess a government’s 
progress towards achieving good governance (Pacific Islands 
Forum Secretariat 2008:33). This article reviews the kinds of 
measures that are becoming available for the Pacific islands.
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The first difficulty in measuring corruption 
is defining what it is. The international 
community tends to follow the definition of 
corruption adopted by the anti-corruption 
non-governmental organisation (NGO) 
Transparency International (TI) and the 
World Bank: the use of public office for 
private gain. National anti-corruption 
agencies tend to follow definitions set out 
in the law, but local popular opinion might 
not agree with either approach. We will 
take these definitional issues into account 
as we look at the evidence produced by, or 
for, national anti-corruption agencies and 
international organisations.
National figures
In most countries of the region the criminal 
code creates offences such as abuse of office, 
misappropriation, secret commissions and 
the bribery of public officials. The police 
may investigate more serious cases and a 
government prosecutor may take the case 
to court. Investigations and successful 
prosecutions are therefore one measure of 
corruption. They do not, however, really 
tell us how much is going on underneath. 
The number of cases and prosecutions 
reflects the competence and zeal of the 
justice system (and the incompetence and 
carelessness of those it catches). Figures are 
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difficult to compare, as cases proceed slowly 
through the justice system, often stalling. 
Stepping back, police and court records are 
rarely gathered together into statistics that 
can be monitored for trends.
Fortunately, there are now some 
specialised agencies devoted to enforcing 
laws against corruption, and there are some 
figures available about their performance. 
The independence constitutions of Papua 
New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu 
provide for ‘leadership codes’, governing 
the behaviour of senior officials and 
politicians and insisting that they declare 
assets, avoid conflicts of interest in their 
private business dealings and generally 
avoid bringing the offices they hold into 
disrepute. These laws are administered 
by the Ombudsman Commission or, in 
Solomon Islands, a separate Leadership 
Code Commission. Recently, there has been 
a new wave of interest in anti-corruption 
laws and institutions. Tuvalu adopted a 
Leadership Code in 2007. In the same year, 
Fiji’s interim government established the 
Fiji Independent Commission Against 
Corruption (FICAC). Tonga set up an Anti 
Corruption Commission in 2008.
Since 1982, 32 Members of Parliament 
have been charged under Papua New 
Guinea’s leadership code and another 
seven under the criminal and leadership 
codes (Ketan 2007:Appendix 1). Nineteen 
of the charges involved misappropriation of 
funds, usually for local expenditure such as 
road building and school subsidies. Another 
three involved the receipt of payments 
of K100,000 from ‘the Prime Minister ’s 
discretionary fund’ as ‘compensation for 
being replaced during a ministerial reshuffle’ 
(in 1992). Two involved payments and 
favours from logging companies, including 
a Jaguar car for a minister. Two involved 
failures to comply with the procedures of the 
commission itself—submitting returns. Two 
MPs were charged with rape and one for 
drunkenly endangering airline passengers. 
Of the outcomes, nine involved the leader 
going to prison and another 16 involved 
the MP being suspended or dismissed 
from office. Forgiving voters, however, 
returned three of the leaders at subsequent 
elections and another managed to retain 
his seat in the 2007 election while in prison 
(pending an appeal). In six cases, the leader 
resigned from office to avoid charges under 
the leadership code, although resignation 
provided no escape from charges under the 
criminal code.
About one-half (35) of the 75 reports 
produced by the Vanuatu Ombudsman 
Commission between 1996 and 2000 
involved misbehaviour by ministers, 
ranging from the issuance of phoney letters 
of credit to foreign fraudsters through to 
awarding themselves compensation and 
favouring their relatives (Hill 2001). The 
most egregious offender was Barak Sope, 
who was convicted of fraud but later 
pardoned by the president. About 15 cases 
involved appointments and promotions of 
individuals in the public service or statutory 
bodies. Another 15 involved the abuse of 
other kinds of discretion over funding, 
housing, the sale of government assets or 
contracts. The National Provident Fund 
was the agency provoking most attention, 
including a riot in Port Vila (three reports).
Solomon Islands’ Leadership Code 
Commission took a less aggressive approach 
towards politicians and was unable to come 
to grips with the large number of financial 
returns it solicited (Larmour 2000). 
Fiji has recently taken a more aggressive 
approach. After the 2006 coup, the army 
removed several ‘tiers’ of officials it 
suspected of corruption (Interview with 
Bainimarama, Fiji Government Online, 19 
September 2007). It invited and investigated 
public complaints and brought suspects 
into the barracks for questioning (Larmour 
2008a). There were complaints about rough 
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treatment and lack of evidence. The interim 
government then established FICAC, 
which had been promised by its elected 
predecessor but not delivered. A retired 
soldier ran FICAC while the government 
searched for a suitable commissioner. Its 
caseload built up quickly. In June 2008, it 
announced that 22 public officials had been 
charged with corruption offences prescribed 
in the penal code, mostly ‘abuse of office’. 
They included many of the chief executive 
officers and board members of statutory 
bodies targeted in the original clean-up 
campaign, a senior policeman and district-
level officials. The former Prime Minister 
was charged with abuse of office during the 
time he had been director of Fijian Holdings 
Limited and, when (as Prime Minister), he 
had been responsible for the Native Lands 
Trust Board. At the time of writing, none of 
these post-coup cases had been decided.
Other agencies provide evidence of 
corruption without necessarily leading to 
prosecutions. The most important, after the 
event, have been auditors-general reports. 
Sua’ Rimoni’s audit reports on Samoa in 
the mid 1990s had a great impact. New to 
government, having worked in the private 
sector, he documented abuses of power and 
machinery by the works and agriculture 
ministers. He was vilified in parliament and 
his contract cut short. In the turmoil that 
followed, a minister named in the reports 
was assassinated.
The Solomon Islands Auditor-General, 
with the help of Australian officials, 
produced a burst of 10 audit reports in 
2005 and 2006. They estimated that over the 
years an amount roughly equivalent to the 
country’s annual gross domestic product 
(GDP) had gone missing (Government of 
Solomon Islands 2007:4)). In the absence 
of record keeping, it was hard to tell where 
it had gone. Shortcomings included non-
compliance with legislation, acting without 
authority and breakdowns in financial 
management. Among them were acts that 
would come under narrower definitions 
of ‘corruption’, such as ‘officials using 
positions of influence to assist family and 
friends to gain from their positions’ and 
‘loss of revenue through poor management, 
corruption and fraud’ (Government of 
Solomon Islands 2007).
In a similar way, Fiji’s Auditor-General 
had reported on what came to be called the 
‘agriculture scam’ that took place under the 
interim government created after the 2000 
coup. Agricultural equipment, planting 
material and other items were bought and 
distributed to Fijian (but not Indo-Fijian) 
farmers. A special audit report found the 
expenditure was unauthorised and the 
equipment had been bought at inflated 
prices from favoured suppliers without 
going out to tender (Government of Fiji 
2002; Mausio 2003). There had been a ‘lack 
of forecasting and planning, poor channels 
of communication and co-ordination and 
no means of performance monitoring and 
control’ and ‘fraud and corruption cannot 
be ruled out’ (Government of Fiji 2002:3, 
23). After drawn-out police investigations, 
a mid ranking official was charged and 
convicted of falsifying invoices in 2005, and 
the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of 
Agriculture was convicted of abuse of office 
in November 2006 (just before the next coup 
and the creation of FICAC). The ministry’s 
principal accountant and two more junior 
officials were convicted in September 2008. 
They had been receiving kickbacks from the 
favoured suppliers. The owner of one of the 
favoured companies was also convicted.
International figures
The anti-corruption laws and agencies 
described above have been national in 
scope, although they have looked overseas 
for inspiration: to Africa, in the case of the 
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Melanesian leadership codes, and Hong 
Kong and Malaysia in the case of FICAC. 
Since the mid 1990s, however, there has 
been an explosion of international interest 
in ‘good governance’, in general, and 
corruption in particular. The Pacific Islands 
Forum made several attempts to adopt a 
model leadership code for its members. This 
international interest has been precipitated 
and serviced by TI, the NGO founded by 
disaffected international civil servants in 
1993. Initially resistant, the World Bank has 
become convinced of the risks of corruption 
to development. Its researchers, particularly 
Daniel Kaufmann, developed increasingly 
sophisticated measures of perceptions, and 
experience, of corruption. As the studies 
have become available—including the 
national integrity systems (NIS) surveys—
they have gradually begun to include the 
Pacific islands in their calculations (Tables 
1–8).
An extract from TI’s Corruption 
Perceptions Index (CPI) is provided (Table 
1). The CPI did not survey corruption 
directly but relied on answers to questions 
about corruption in other surveys and 
assessments already carried out by ratings 
agencies, think tanks, and so on. These were 
processed into a score, which then could be 
used to compare one country with another. 
The key figure in Table 1 is the country’s 
score, out of 10, where 10 is ‘clean’ and 
zero is ‘dirty’. This score is derived from 
the findings of at least three independent 
surveys. The absence of such surveys 
delayed the inclusion of Pacific islands until 
the mid 2000s. The ranking in Column 1 is 
of the country in relation to all the other 
countries covered in that year. In 2008, 
Samoa did best and Papua New Guinea 
was the worst of the Pacific island countries.
The CPI is a measure of perceptions. TI was 
originally uneasy about adopting the CPI, 
proposed by academic economist Johan 
Lambsdorff (Galtung 2007). It feared the 
public rankings might antagonise the very 
governments they were seeking to influence. 
TI was established by reformers, and the 
index was silent about what countries 
should do to improve their performance. 
For example, when Tonga was included, 
the Prime Minister’s advisor complained 
‘it has no meaning because the report they 
produced has not pointed out exactly where 
the corruption is’ (Radio New Zealand, 29 
January 2008). Nevertheless, international 
league tables are irresistible to the media, 
even if their reports miss the distinction 
between perceptions and experience or 
Table 1 Transparency International 2008 Corruption Perceptions index
Country rank (out of 
180 countries)
Country CPI score 2008 
(10 is best)
Confidence 
intervals
Number of 
surveys used
62 Samoa 4.4 3.4–4.8 3
96 Kiribati 3.1 2.5–3.4 3
109 Vanuatu 2.9 2.4–3.7 3
109 Solomon Islands 2.9 2.5–3.2 3
138 Tonga 2.4 1.9–2.6 3
151 Papua New Guinea 2.0 1.6–3.3 6
Source: www.transparency.org (accessed 10 March 2009).
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reality. TI stooped to conquer, but has also 
gone on to produce other measures that 
respond to criticism of the CPI and are 
described below: detailed country-level 
studies; a ranking of bribe givers (China, 
France, and so on); and a barometer of 
popular opinion, rather than opinions of 
business leaders. It has also provided much 
more detail on its web site about how the 
CPI is assembled (Lambsdorff 2008).
‘Control of corruption’ is only one of 
several governance indicators developed by 
Kaufmann and his colleagues at the World 
Bank (Table 2). As with the CPI, it is based 
on ‘a large number of business, citizen and 
expert surveys’ (World Bank 2007). Results 
for Pacific island countries for which such 
data are available are shown (Table 2). 
The ranking in this case is of the countries 
against each other, rather than the world. 
Among a larger group of Pacific countries 
than those measured by the CPI, Guam does 
best and New Caledonia does worst (both, 
incidentally, are overseas territories of, 
respectively, the United States and France). 
Of the independent states, Cook Islands 
does best and Tonga the worst.
The TI and World Bank indices rely 
on opinion and (occasionally) experience, 
processed to produce a single score—or 
range of scores—for corruption. They have to 
rely on the definitions of corruption adopted 
by these surveys and the respondents 
to them. Lambsdorff (2008:5) describes 
how his sources use various definitions, 
covering different forms of corruption, but 
which he believes ‘can be said to aim at 
measuring the same broad phenomenon’. 
Kaufmann and his colleagues emphasise the 
complexity of governance, the imprecision 
of their measures and the limitations to 
comparison.
A group of economists at the University 
of the South Pacific (USP) (Gani et al. n.d.) 
Table 2 World Bank Control of Corruption Indicator, 2006
Percentile rank 
(1–100) Country
Governance score 
(–2.5 – +2.5) Standard error
75.7 Guam 0.8 0.39
72.3 Cook Islands 0.66 0.76
63.1 Samoa 0.22 0.3
62.6 Vanuatu 0.2 0.3
59.2 Kiribati 0.08 0.3
56.3 Tuvalu –0.07 0.37
50.0 Federated States of Micronesia –0.27 0.43
49.0 Solomon Islands –0.29 0.3
45.6 Fiji –0.35 0.29
38.3 Marshall Islands –0.53 0.43
9.2 Papua New Guinea –1.13 0.18
5.3 Tonga –1.29 0.3
4.4 New Caledonia –1.33 0.57
Source: World Bank, 2007. A Decade of Measuring the Quality of Governance. Governance Matters 2007. Annual 
indicators and underlying data, World Bank, Washington, DC.
How mucH corruPtion is tHere in tHe PAcific islAnds? A review of  
diffErEnt aPProacHEs to mEasurEmEnt
149
Pacific Economic Bulletin Volume 24 number 1 2009 © the australian national university
have tried to get around the problem of 
relying largely on perceptions. Like the 
other sponsors of the global indicators, they 
were interested in influencing governments 
and anticipated that politicians could 
easily shrug off negative opinions. Instead, 
they looked for hard data, mostly already 
available in official statistics that were 
updated each year. They used the standard 
definition of corruption as ‘abuse of 
public power for private benefit’. They 
mention the opportunities that price fixing, 
import restrictions, complicated taxes and 
‘regulations about types of workers to 
hire’ provide for unscrupulous officials to 
extract bribes. So it is really a measure of 
risks rather than acts of corruption they are 
talking about. They looked for indicators of 
that risk and believed they had found it in 
the proportions of ‘economic services’ and 
‘recurrent’ expenditure to total expenditure. 
(I wonder what counts as ‘economic 
services’ in each country’s budget; and 
might not some of those services reduce 
rather than exacerbate corruption? Why 
is capital expenditure regarded as less 
risky than recurrent expenditure?) These 
proportions were then scaled and averaged 
to produce an annual index for each of 
the seven Pacific island countries they 
surveyed. This approach allows them to 
compare countries with each other and see 
trends—and find some good news stories. 
In aggregate, between 1995 and 2006, 
they found ‘substantial improvements in 
governance quality’ for Cook Islands, Fiji, 
Vanuatu and Samoa (Gani et al. n.d.:4). 
Solomon Islands’ governance quality, 
however, declined over the period. The 
authors suggested that the improvements 
were the result of the economic reform 
programs supported by donors.
Some comparisons are made between 
rankings and scores, between surveys 
and over time (Tables 3 and 4). There is 
a temptation for governments, and their 
critics, to grab hold of changes in the score 
and ranking as evidence of the success or 
failure of their efforts to reduce corruption. 
The USP’s indicators show a striking reversal 
in relative performance in the 10 years since 
1995, with Samoa and Papua New Guinea 
Table 3 Rankings compared, for countries that appear in every survey
TI CPI (2008)  
corruption perceptions
World Bank (2006) 
control of corruption
USP (1995)  
government 
effectiveness (including 
corruption)
USP (2005)  
government 
effectiveness (including 
corruption)
Samoa Samoa Vanuatu Papua New Guinea
Solomon Islands Vanuatu Tonga Samoa
Vanuatu Solomon Islands Solomon Islands Vanuatu
Tonga Papua New Guinea Samoa Tonga
Papua New Guinea Tonga Papua New Guinea Solomon Islands
Source:  www.transparency.org (accessed 10 March 2009); World Bank, 2007. A Decade of Measuring the Quality 
of Governance, Governance Matters 2007. Annual indicators and underlying data, World Bank, Washington, DC.
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going from worst of this group to best: it 
would be hard for them to resist crowing. 
The tables show how this temptation should 
be resisted, but how hard it is to resist. 
The CPI is first of all a perceptions 
index, and perceptions can lead or lag 
behind changes in policy and their effects. 
Second, as the data on popular perceptions 
discussed below suggest, they could be 
well-embedded prejudices, favourable 
or unfavourable, that are impervious to 
policy changes. Third, the CPI is designed 
to move slowly. The CPI ‘includes the 
previous two years’ score in calculating 
this year’s’ (Galtung 2007). Lambsdorff 
(2008:3) notes that the CPI ‘provides a 
snapshot of the views of business people 
and country analysts, with less of a focus 
on year-to-year trends’. Fourth, the rankings 
depend not only on a country’s score but on 
whether other countries have joined or left 
the ranking above or below it. A country’s 
ranking can go up or down whatever it 
does, as other countries join or leave the 
table above or below it (this effect will 
decline as more and more countries are 
regularly included). Fifth, the rankings are 
a treadmill of reputations. It is not possible 
for a country to improve its ranking if all 
others are perceived to be improving at the 
same time.
Fiji was the first to be scored and ranked 
in the CPI (in 2005), but it has since dropped 
out. TI’s web site mentions an insufficient 
number of surveys. Fiji then received a 
relatively high score for the region (4), lower 
only than Samoa in later years (Table 4), and 
its global ranking of 55 was shared with 
Bulgaria, Colombia and Seychelles. The 
years of the coup, the ‘clean-up campaign’ 
and FICAC are unscored, and no doubt 
much will be made of the figures by the 
interim government, and its critics, when 
they appear. Here it needs to be said that 
the local branches of TI, which tend to be 
victimised by governments when poor 
Table 4 CPI scores and rankings in different years
Country
2008  
score (/10)  
rank (/180)
2007  
score (/10)  
rank (/180)
2006 
score (/10)  
rank (/163)
2005 
score /10)  
rank (/159)
Samoa 4.4 (62) 4.5 (57)
Fiji 4.0 (55)
Kiribati 3.1 (96) 3.3 (84)
Solomon Islands 2.9 (109) 2.8 (111)
Vanuatu 2.9 (109) 3.1 (98)
Tonga 2.4 (138) 1.7 (175)
Papua New 
Guinea 2.0 (151) 2.0 (162) 2.4 (130) 2.3 (130)
Source:  www.transparency.org (accessed 10 March 2009)
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rankings are reported in the local press, 
have nothing to do with the production of 
the CPI, which is the responsibility of the 
organisation’s headquarters in Berlin.
Blaming the victim?
Developing countries tend to cluster 
towards the bottom of TI’s global rankings. 
Their governments are often tempted to 
throw the accusation back in the face of 
the West. Why blame us when it is your 
companies that are doing the corrupting? 
Corruption is a two-way street. Mindful of 
these objections to its CPI, TI commissioned 
another survey—of bribe payers rather than 
recipients. The latest survey, in 2006, asked 
‘business executives’ from 125 countries 
about the behaviour of firms from 30 
countries doing business in their country 
(Table 5). The question was about experience 
and defined what it meant by corruption: 
‘In your experience, to what extent do firms 
from the countries you have selected make 
undocumented extra payments or bribes?’
There was, however, a sting in the 
tail: those bribed by foreigners were also 
bribing each other: ‘All the data indicated 
that domestically owned companies in the 
15 countries surveyed have a very high 
propensity to pay bribes—higher than that 
of foreign firms’ (www.transparency.org, 
accessed 10 March 2009).
The results of the 2006 Bribe Payers Index 
(BPI) (Table 5) help explain the corruption 
in the forestry industries of Papua New 
Guinea and Solomon Islands. Malaysian 
and South Korean timber companies were 
involved and their countries ranked low 
on TI’s survey (twenty-first and twenty-
fifth, respectively). China and Taiwan, 
whose official competition for diplomatic 
recognition has also aggravated suspicions 
of corruption throughout the Pacific region, 
do even worse. Russia’s companies (twenty-
eighth) feature in US concerns about money 
laundering in Nauru. Australia’s interest 
in the matter is also explained (Table 5): 
Australia’s companies have a reputation 
for cleanness that could put them at a 
competitive disadvantage in global trade. 
From being ranked top in 2002, however, 
Australia slipped to third in 2006.
We find another, quantifiable picture of 
international corruption in John Murray’s 
(2007) memoir of his 10 years in charge of the 
Australian Federal Police’s Pacific islands 
desk, published as The Minnows of Triton. The 
main problem he identifies is ‘premeditated 
opportunism by white-collar fraudsters 
and widespread domestic corruption’. Of 
the 69 scams he describes, much the largest 
number (25) deal with various forms of 
banking and investment fraud. The iconic 
fraud is what is called the ‘prime bank 
instrument’ (PBI) fraud, premised on 
the so-called existence of a secret market 
within which the world’s prime banks are 
said to trade financial instruments on a 
daily basis in billion-dollar volumes and 
at huge, irreversible and perpetual profits 
(NZ Serious Fraud Office, www.sfo.govt.
nz, accessed 29 January 2008).
Vanuatu’s certificates, signed by 
ministers and top officials, are the best 
example. Passport scams come second 
(seven), followed by tourist hotels and 
resorts (six), which leave physical ruins 
such as the Sheraton in Cook Islands, the 
Royal International in Tonga and the Grand 
Pacific in Suva (a victim of Nauru’s collapse, 
not Fiji’s). Casinos and gambling (four), real 
estate (three) and shipping registers (three) 
were also popular. Nineteen scams targeted 
government officials and 22 targeted 
ministers. This government focus gives them 
their ‘corrupt’ inflection. Only four seemed 
to target local individuals; and in four cases 
the Pacific island was merely the base for 
defrauding individuals elsewhere. There 
is a thin and permeable line between these 
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Table 5 Bribe payers index, 2006
Rank Country Score Margin of error (95 per cent confidence)
1 Switzerland 7.81 0.12
2 Sweden 7.62 0.14
3 Australia 7.59 0.14
4 Austria 7.50 0.13
5 Canada 7.46 0.12
6 United Kingdom 7.39 0.09
7 Germany 7.34 0.09
8 Netherlands 7.28 0.12
9 Belgium 7.22 0.15
10 United States 7.22 0.07
11 Japan 7.10 0.10
12 Singapore 6.78 0.17
13 Spain 6.63 0.12
14 United Arab Emirates 6.62 0.14
15 France 6.50 0.11
16 Portugal 6.47 0.18
17 Mexico 6.45 0.15
18 Hong Kong 6.01 0.16
19 Israel 6.01 0.16
20 Italy 5.94 0.12
21 South Korea 5.83 0.13
22 Saudi Arabia 5.75 0.17
23 Brazil 5.65 0.16
24 South Africa 5.61 0.16
25 Malaysia 5.59 0.17
26 Taiwan 5.41 0.15
27 Turkey 5.23 0.15
28 Russia 5.16 0.14
29 China 4.94 0.11
30 India 4.62 0.14
Source: www.transparency.org (accessed 3 July 2008).
How mucH corruPtion is tHere in tHe PAcific islAnds? A review of  
diffErEnt aPProacHEs to mEasurEmEnt
153
Pacific Economic Bulletin Volume 24 number 1 2009 © the australian national university
scams and more legitimate money-spinners 
promoted to, and by, island governments. 
Among these are investment incentives, tax 
havens and sales of passports.
Public opinion
However international organisations 
define corruption, and whatever the 
law says, public opinion also matters in 
democracies such as those in the Pacific 
islands (Warren 2004). Elected politicians 
need to be mindful of their constituents’ 
opinions. Anti-corruption campaigns need 
to attract popular support. Differences 
between the law and public opinion can lead 
to changes in the law (or ‘public education’ 
campaigns to bring citizens back into line). 
The surveys tend to show public opinion 
as highly critical of corruption, finding 
it widespread and growing. The PNG 
Ombudsman Commission cited surveys in 
Port Moresby, Lae, Arawa and Buka in 2005 
showing that between 70 and 80 per cent 
of the people surveyed in the Community 
Crime Surveys considered that corruption 
nationally was increasing. In fact, very 
few people considered it to be decreasing 
(Ombudsman Commission of Papua New 
Guinea 2006:6).
A pilot survey carried out in Solomon 
Islands found 62 per cent of the sample 
of the rural population and 46 per cent 
of the sample of the urban population 
believed the government was corrupt. 
Focus groups, however, found ‘no universal 
agreement on what constituted corruption 
(and some tendency to challenge the 
conventional Western view of it)’ (Regional 
Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands 
(RAMSI) 2006). The NIS surveys, described 
below, provide more evidence of the way 
culture affects perceptions of corruption, 
its seriousness, who is to blame and what 
should be done about it (Larmour 2008).
Before the coup in Fiji in 2006, public 
opinion was surveyed as part of TI’s Global 
Corruption Barometer. Like the BPI, but 
unlike the CPI, the barometer is based on 
interviews conducted for the purpose. It asks 
ordinary people rather than businesspeople 
about their perceptions and experience of 
corruption in particular sectors, so answers 
from particular countries can be compared 
with responses around the world. The 
results were perplexing (Table 6).
Table 6 Perceptions of corruption and bribes paid, by sector, in Fiji, 2006
 
Percentage who 
perceived the sector as 
‘extremely corrupt’
Percentage who paid 
a bribe (of those who 
had contact with the 
sector)
Percentage who paid 
a bribe (world-wide 
average including 
Fiji)
Tax revenue 25 3 3
Utilities 25 1 5
Registry and permits 18 4 9
Police 22 7 17
Medical services 20 2 6
Legal/judiciary 19 5 8
Education system 19 1 5
Source: Tebbutt Research, 2006. Corruption Survey, Transparency International, Suva.
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There is a large gap between perceptions 
and experience (Table 6). For example, 25 
per cent of people surveyed thought the tax 
system highly corrupt, but only 3 per cent 
of people who dealt with the system paid 
a bribe. Maybe they are under-reporting 
their experience, or maybe it is higher-
level ‘grand’ corruption that they have in 
mind. Maybe they are reporting indirect 
knowledge or common knowledge in a small 
society. The gap, however, is not unusual. 
Claudio Abramo of Transparencia Brazil 
has looked at the statistical relationships 
between experience and opinions in the 
corruption barometer world-wide. He 
finds ‘perceptions are not good predictors 
for experiences’ and vice versa (Abramo 
2007:7). Perceptions of corruption, however, 
correlate with other opinions about prices, 
poverty, the environment, and so on. 
Reviewing 10 years of cross-national 
comparisons, Daniel Treisman (2007) 
reaches similar conclusions. There is a 
strong correlation between the surveys of 
peoples’ perceptions of corruption, but the 
link between perceptions and experience 
is much weaker, particularly in poorer 
countries.
In the developed democracies of 
Europe and North America, reported 
bribery is rare and the corruption level 
is consistently perceived to be low. But 
among the countries perceived to have 
the highest corruption, there are some 
(eg Paraguay and the Cameroons) 
where a large proportion of residents 
report paying bribes, whereas in 
others (eg Venezuela and Nicaragua) 
very few do so. (Treisman 2007:219)
Treisman (2007:241) suspects that the indices 
measure ‘[n]ot corruption itself but guesses 
about its extent in particular countries 
that experts or survey respondents have 
derived by applying conventional theories 
about corruption’s causes. These same 
conventional theories inform the hypotheses 
of researchers, which turn out—surprise!—
to fit the data well.’
National integrity systems 
surveys
TI’s surveys of national integrity systems 
focus on a country’s anti-corruption 
architecture, rather than corruption as 
such. The theory behind this approach is 
that a country’s integrity (the opposite of 
corruption) is upheld by a number of ‘pillars’, 
such as the legislature, the executive and 
oversight agencies. It is a plausible theory 
that can be traced back to the designers 
of the US constitution, who believed that 
institutional checks and balances could 
reduce corruption. So far, 14 Pacific island 
countries have been surveyed. Manu 
Barcham and I coordinated the surveys of 
12 of them (Larmour and Barcham 2006). We 
found widespread popular perceptions of 
corruption (as Abramo and Treisman would 
have expected among poorer countries) 
but our table (reproduced here as Table 
7) showed most of the pillars of national 
integrity systems were in place. The pillars 
seemed to be ‘hollow’. It now seems to 
me that the surveys were running ahead 
of themselves: focusing on the presumed 
remedies before analysing the corruption 
problems they were meant to solve. I 
later re-examined the surveys, looking at 
types (rather than amounts) of corruption 
identified in each country. I summarised 
28 different types of corruption (Table 8). 
They can be clustered into seven broader 
types: general administrative corruption; 
vulnerable branches of government; risky 
distributions of cash; ‘guarding the guards’; 
political corruption; corruption outside 
government; and sovereignty sales. These 
data, summarised in Table 8, show a richer 
texture and more internal variation than 
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Table 7, but many empty cells show ‘don’t 
know’. It also shows some institutions (such 
as courts and electoral commissions in many 
countries) are not seen as corrupt. 
Conclusions
Corruption is a complex, secretive 
phenomenon. Particular acts can be 
interpreted in different ways, so it is no 
surprise that it is hard to measure and that 
measures disagree. The limitations of the 
surveys need to be recognised if they are 
going to be used as a basis for withholding 
aid, as the Pacific Plan proposes, as arguments 
for economic reform or as justifications for 
military coups. Based on the comparisons 
above, I try to summarise their relative 
strengths and weaknesses below.
Definitions 
The national agencies use relatively clear 
legal definitions; the BPI was on strong 
ground when it explained its definition 
to respondents. The CPI and World Bank 
surveys have to skate over differences 
in what respondents might mean by 
corruption, or assume their respondents 
have been talking about the same thing. The 
NIS surveys have picked up local differences 
in people’s understanding of corruption and 
the seriousness with which they regard it 
(Larmour 2008b). People answering public 
opinion surveys could be talking about 
wider systemic and moral failings as well as 
specific acts such as bribes: we do not know 
until we ask them more closely, as the NIS 
researchers have done.
Scope 
The TI/World Bank definition limits 
attention to ‘public office’. The USP research 
was extremely suspicious of public sector 
failings. In the Pacific islands, a focus on 
the public sector could be apposite, as 
private sectors are relatively small. The 
barometer found public opinion suspicious 
of ‘business’, after ‘parliament’ and ‘political 
parties’. The NIS researchers were asked 
to look for corruption in the private sector 
and among NGOs. The BPI and Murray’s 
memoir, however, turned attention to the 
international givers as well as the receivers 
of bribes. While the national agencies focus 
on a subgroup of leaders, or a wider group 
of public officers, some national legislation 
allows them to charge the private sector 
people who conspired with them, as in the 
agriculture scam cases in Fiji.
Precision 
Figures for confidence intervals (in Table 1) 
and standard errors (in Table 2) show that 
the range of possible scores for each country 
often overlaps with their neighbours. 
Kaufmann and his World Bank colleagues 
are particularly alert to the imprecision 
of the data and the danger of making too 
much of small differences in numbers. 
They urge readers to think of countries as 
falling into broad bands (‘good’, ‘bad’ and 
‘in-between’) rather than steps on a ladder. 
The audit reports, carried out after the event, 
had a more precise, forensic style than the 
more discursive NIS reports, although they 
had difficulty in distinguishing corruption 
from a background noise of incompetence, 
mismanagement and poor record keeping.
Aggregation 
The CPI, BPI and NIS are produced by 
international organisations and tend to treat 
countries as the natural unit of analysis. This 
can create the impression that corruption 
is a characteristic of a whole population, 
the entire territory or the whole system 
of government. No wonder they provoke 
angry nationalist responses: ‘What, all 
of us?’ The NIS provides more sectoral 
detail but its theory compels it to systemic 
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answers. It can, however, be disaggregated 
(as in Table 8) to show how particular 
sectors are more prone to corruption than 
others, showing more variation between 
and within countries, and perhaps breaking 
the problem down into something more 
manageable.
Perceptions and experience 
Some experience data are folded into the 
World Bank data (World Bank 2007:18). The 
2002 BPI probes experience. When asked 
in the first such survey done in 2002 where 
their knowledge came from, 52 per cent of 
the respondents cited ‘personal experience’ 
and 34 per cent cited ‘direct experience of 
people in your company’, while others cited 
the media or information from colleagues 
and friends. In the barometer, experience 
and perceptions seem quite disconnected, 
especially in poorer countries.
Recycled data 
The CPI and World Bank data are second-
hand, collected for other purposes, and 
some of the similarities between rankings 
in Table 3 probably have to do with being 
derived from the same data. The results are 
a little muffled and indirect—like a sausage, 
or a financial derivative—and it is not 
very clear how much good data are being 
combined with bad data. Much has to be 
taken on trust. The BPI and the barometer 
do their own survey work. The NIS studies 
are also based on original, though uneven 
fieldwork, as are the national audit reports 
and ombudsman commission reports. The 
USP governance indices rely on budget data 
produced for other purposes; its difficulty 
lies in the distance between the proxy 
measures it uses—ratios between types of 
public expenditure—and the phenomenon 
that it seeks to measure (corruption).
Theoretical prejudices 
Treisman’s review of global studies 
concluded that perceptions of corruption 
were shaped by the observer’s expectation 
of what could be causing it, or associated 
with it. Theory comes before evidence. To 
some extent, this is an inevitable problem of 
human perception: we bring prior frames to 
our understanding of events. We also need 
to be open to falsification. The CPI and USP 
surveys were mostly theory driven. The CPI 
started with an assumption that corruption 
was caused by the absence of a functioning 
‘integrity system’. The USP indices started 
from the idea that public expenditure 
created risks for corruption. Both of these 
theories are plausible, and well regarded, 
but they do not explain why corruption 
takes place in spite of the presence of the NIS 
(that is, in most of the Pacific), or in some 
recurrent expenditure but not others.
Expertise 
Tables 1–8 are bedevilled by problems of 
definition, knowledge and expertise. What 
do the investigators or respondents really 
know about corruption? The CPI assumes 
businessmen and financial journalists know 
best. It is often criticised on nationalist 
grounds: what do these foreigners know? 
Lambsdorff (2008:6) replies that the surveys 
he uses question foreigners and residents, 
and correlate well with each other. The 
Fijian Army has been criticised (including 
by myself) for acting without sufficient 
evidence in its ‘clean-up campaign’, but 
now FICAC is bringing evidence to court. 
Expertise is more professionalised in audit 
reports and police work, and can be tested 
in adversarial courtroom procedures. The 
barometer assumes ordinary people know 
best, yet Abramo and Treisman found strong 
opinions floating free of direct experience. 
When does ‘common knowledge’ become 
‘folklore’ (Myrdal 1968)? The researchers 
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commissioned to carry out the NIS studies 
had local knowledge, but were not specialists 
in corruption and had funds for only a 
couple of weeks’ fieldwork. Table 8 is full 
of ‘don’t knows’. A more relativistic defence 
of the perception indicators is that their 
relationship to reality is to some extent 
irrelevant. Business perceptions determine 
decisions to invest, and popular perceptions 
determine the legitimacy of governments. 
That conclusion, however, sits uneasily with 
the positivistic tone of the surveys.
Reform 
The new international interest in corruption 
is motivated by a desire for reform, hence the 
interest in comparisons across time, so that 
progress can be measured. The CPI is a poor 
register of change and the effects of reform. 
The score is deliberately damped down to 
avoid sharp year-on-year changes. Changes 
in ranking depend on what happens in other 
countries and whether they are surveyed, 
as well as what any country does itself. 
Rankings are potentially treadmills. The USP 
approach shows change most sharply (and 
explains it in terms of economic reforms). 
The Abramo/Treisman arguments about 
popular opinion have unsettling implications 
for donor-sponsored campaigns to ‘raise 
awareness’ about corruption: awareness is 
likely to be high anyway and related to a 
wider sense of injustice, but is not a good 
guide to where corruption is really taking 
place. The data produced by national anti-
corruption agencies provide a depressing 
account of bad behaviour: in a grim kind 
of positive feedback, the better they are at 
the job the more corruption they uncover. 
The USP measures have some good news to 
tell about Samoa and Papua New Guinea, 
although the CPI takes a dimmer view of 
the latter. Murray’s memoir of his Pacific 
experience also suggests something is 
working: of 69 scams he described, 36 were 
rebuffed or resisted.
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